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Regulating the Multinational:
A Note on the Divestment Myth*
ROBERTO DAMINO**
This article analyzes one of the primary systems developing countries
employ in regulating foreign investment: the creation of foreign/local joint
ventures through obligatory divestment; that is, the conversion of wholly-
owned subsidiaries into partially-owned companies through the forced sale
of majority capital interests to national investors. The analysis will focus on
the Andean version of divestment because the Andean Investment Code'
presents divestment in its most innovative fashion. The purpose of the arti-
cle is merely to encourage further study of joint ventures, not to present
definitive conclusions thereon.
I. BACKGROUND
The awareness in developing countries of the need for foreign invest-
ment and technology has also increased the concern about the threat that
foreign influx presents to their economic, political, and cultural
sovereignty.2 In this context, much attention has lately been focused on the
multinational' enterprise (MNE). In the last decade, no topic has generated
more concern among both developed and developing countries than the
economic, social, and political role of the MNE. The ever-proliferating
literature on the subject, ranging from near fiction to highly sophisticated
technical analysis, demonstrates the increasing level and variety of this con-
cern.
*The author gratefully acknowledges the comments and suggestions of David M. Smith and
Samuel Stern of Harvard Law School.
**LL. M., Harvard University; LL. B., Pontifica Universidad Catolica del Peru.
1. The Code is in force in Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Its text,
as amended, appears in I I Int'l Legal Materials 126 (1972). Venezuela's ratification appears in
12 Int'l Legal Materials 344 (1973). A proposed amendment has been recently adopted through
Decision 103; for a summary of its contents, see 4 Latin Am. Econ. Rep. 45 (Nov. 1975).
2. For a summary of the Latin American stance, see How Latin American Views the U.S.
Investor (R. Vernon ed. 1966).
3. For some scholars, the word "transnational" should be substituted for
"multinational," since the former may better convey the notion that these entities operate from
their home bases across national borders. See United Nations Secretariat, The Impact of Mul-
tinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations, New York, U.N.E.
74. I1. A. 5, 1974, at 25 [hereinafter cited as the Eminents' Report]. However, while this obser-
vation is semantically correct, usage in this context has the same connotation as the term
multinational.
4. Since these entities are not always incorporated, the word "enterprise," instead of cor-
poration is more appropriate. For an analysis of the differences between classical direct and
foreign direct investment, international holdings, and MNE's, see Behrman, The Multinational
Enterprise: Its Initiatives and Governmental Reaction. 6 J. Int'l L. & Econ. 2 (1972). On
definitional alternatives, see United Nations Secretariat, Multinational Corporations in World
Development, New York, U.N.E. 73. 11. A. II. 1973. See also Fatouros, The Computer and the
Mud Hut: Notes on Multinational Enterprise in Developing Countries. 10 Colum. J. Transnat'l L.
325 (1972).
5. For an introductory bibliography, see United Nations Secretariat, Transnational Cor-
porations, U.N. Doe. ST/LIB SER.B/15, (Feb. 1975). See also Council on Planning
Librarians, Multinational Corporations, Technology, and Developing Countries (111. Feb.
1975).
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The Multinational Enterprise
The MNE may be characterized as a business organization composed
of trading, producing, and/or financing units throughout the world, con-
trolled by a parent unit. The behavior of the MNE conforms to a global
business strategy. The degree of such control, the ways in which it is im-
plemented, the types of strategies, the organizational structures, manage-
ment practices, and business policies vary substantially from one MNE to
another. 6 Even within a single MNE, components exhibit significant dif-
ferences in accordance with the geographical areas in which they operate.'
One thing, however, is certain: the enormous economic power which MNE's
concentrate. 8 This is the great concern of both developed and developing
countries attempting to devise efficient means of coping with the power of
the MNE.9
Literature has paid far less attention to this problem than to attempts
to discover the "real personality" of the MNE.10 The primary difficulty en-
countered in regulating MNE's is the insufficiency of current legal theory
dealing with the reality of MNE's. " The theory which describes foreign in-
vestment as a direct function of expected profits is qualified, in the context
of an MNE, by the importance of achieving and maintaining a market posi-
tion. 2 Furthermore, the importance of capital as the main support of inter-
national trade is now matched, and probably surpassed, by the significance
of technology. Even the traditional concept of the enterprise, especially in
6. See J. Stopford & L. Wells, Managing the Multinational Enterprise (1972). Seealso I M.
Brooke & H. Remmes, The Strategy of Multinational Enterprise: Organization and Finance pt.
1 (1970).
7. See R. Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprise, chs.
2,3,5 (1971). See also Shetty, Ownership, Size, Technology, and Management Development: A
Comparative Analysis, Academy of Management J.,(Dec. 1971); S. Davis, Organizational
Behavior in Multinational Enterprise, Cases and Materials (Harv. Bus, Sch. 1974).
8. As to MNEs' economical power, see J. Vaupel and J_ Curhan, The World's Mul-
tinational Enterprises: A Sourcebook of Tables (Harv. Bus. Sch. 1973). See also United Na-
tions Secretariat, supra note 4. As to the degree of political power which MNE's concentrate
there is intense controversy. See generally Transnational Relations and World Politics (J. Nye
& R. Keohane eds. 1972).
9. Such worldwide concern has motivated several actions from the U.N., especially the
sponsorship of a number of studies, referred to in n.5 supra, and very recently, the request for
the Eminents' Report, pursuant to Resolution 1721 (LIII) of The Economic and Social Coun-
cil. See also United Nations Secretariat, Summary of the Hearings Before the Group of Emi-
nent Persons to Study the Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on In-
ternational Relations, New York, U.N.E. 74. 11. A. 9, 1974 [hereinafter referred to as Eminents
Hearings].
10. On the legal implications of MNEs and their regulation, see Vagts, The Multinational
Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 739 (1970); Fatouros,
supra note 4. See also White, La Naturaleza Juridica de las Empresas Multinacionales, 31
Derecho-Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (1973); Orrego, El Control de las Empresas
Multinacionales, XIV Foro Internacional 106 (Chile, 1973).
11. As to the lack of" an international legal framework, see Duven, Multinational Com-
panies as a Political Problem, The World Today (November 1972). See also Vagts, The Global
Corporation and International Law, 6 J. Int'l L, & Econ. 247 (1972). As to the insufficiency of
legal theory, see White, supra note 10
12. White, supra note 10.
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regard to the "individuality" of the concept, is exceeded by the fact that the
economic units which compose an MNE have lost, in varying degrees, their
individuality.' 3 The fact that MNE's are centrally controlled from abroad is
often asserted by developing countries to be the core of the problem. The
concern is that policies implemented by MNE's have either disregarded or
have been plainly contrary to the priorities, needs, and interests of the host
countries."'
The Andean Code
Developing nations are devising ways in which host governments will
be able to influence effectively the policies, strategies, and general activities
of foreign investors operating in their territories. As expressed by the draf-
ters of the Andean Code:s
[One of the Code's main purposes is] to enable host govern-
ments to assume a proper role in the orientation and direction of
their economic policy. To this end, the behavior of the enterprise
must be adjusted to such policy ... but, insofar as the centers
where the policies of the enterprise are designed remain outside the
national territory and jurisdiction, this objective will be impossible
to reach. It is thus necessary to adopt rules which lead to placing
those decision centers within the national territory.' 6
One of the main ways whereby the Andean and many other "governments
have sought ways to reduce control of foreign-owned affiliates and alter
their behavior is to reduce the extent of foreign shareholding."' 7
13. Id. Paradoxically, the central control is still achieved through the internationally
"decentralized" type of organization. See Vagts supra note 10, at 752.
14. See M. Guerrero, El Regimen Comun de la Inversion Extranjera en el Grupo Andino, La
Dimension Juridica de la lntegracion 234 (INTAL, Buenos Aires 1973).
15. For an analysis of the Code from the perspective of the Andean scholars, see M.
Guerrero, supra note 14. Mr- Guerrero is the Legal Advisor to the Andean Pact's Junta. See
also McLean, Consideraciones Preliminares a un Estudio del Regimen Legal de las Inversiones
Extranjeras en el Peru. 31 Derecho-Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (1974). Mr.
McLean is the Legal Advisor to the Peruvian agency in control of foreign investments. For
studies published in the United States, see Lopez-Valdez, The Andean Investment Code, 7J. Int'l
L. & Econ. 1(1972); Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for
Normative Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 763 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Oliver]; Schliesser, Restrictions on Foreign Investment in the Andean Common Market, 5 Int'l
Law. 586 (197 1); Schliesser, Recent Developments in Latin American Foreign Investment Laws. 7
Int'l Law. 357 (1973); Schill, The Mexican and Andean Investment Codes, 6 Law & Pol'y Int'l
Bus. 437 (1974); Council of the Americas, The Common Treatment of Foreign Capital in Andean
Bloc (comment memorandum, N.Y. 1971); Council of the Americas, Definitions, Design, and
Analysis (Nov. 1973); Diaz, The Andean Common Market: A Challenge to Foreign Investors, 6
Colum. J. World Bus. 22 (July-Aug. 1971); Swan, The Andean Code: A Preliminary Appraisal. 5
Law. Am. 259(1973).
16. Proposal No. 4 of the Junta to the Comisi6n del Acuerdo de Cartagena, cited in G.
Fernandez, El R6gimen Uniforme de la Empresa Multinacional en el Grupo Andino, La
Dimensi6n Juridica de la Integracion 275 (INTAL, Buenos Aires 1973)_
17. J. Behrman, Conflicting Constraints on the Multinational Enterprise 52 (Council of
the Americas 1974).
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The Andean divestment or "Transformacion," which has been con-
ceived as the Andean Code's most important feature," is a system whereby
national investors progressively acquire the majority ownership and control
of the enterprises operating in the host country. "[F]oreign enterprises are
obliged to transform into national or mixed enterprises. '"'
The divestment timetable for enterprises operating on or before June
30, 1971 is as follows:
Colombia, Chile
Peru, Venezuela
3 years
10 years
15 years
Bolivia,
Ecuador
3 years
13 years and
4 months
20 years
This timetable basically applies to the manufacturing industry.
Note: These figures denote a maximum for time and a minimum for per-
centages of national ownership and control. The time periods are computed
from the date the Code became effective. Divestment for these enterprises is
voluntary, but those which choose not to divest may not benefit from the
trade liberalization programs of the Andean Common Market.
As for enterprises created after June 30, 1971, the timetable is as
follews:
Chile, Colombia,
Peru, Venezuela
3 years
5 years
10 years
15 years
Bolivia,
Ecuador
3 years
"6 years and
8 months
13 years and
4 months
20 years
This timetable also applies to the manufacturing industry.
Note: These figures denote a maximum for time and a minimum for percen-
tage of national ownership and control. The time periods are computed
18. See Lopez-Valdez, supra note 15. See also M. Guerrero, supra note 14.
19. Decisions 100 and 103 have somewhat altered the base dates for the implementation of
prior Decisions. The base date for divestment is now June 30, 1974.
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from the day the enterprise commenced production. Divestment for these
enterprises is obligatory.20
Joint Ventures
There is a seemingly broad consensus concerning the virtues of divest-
ment and the mutual benefits of joint ventures that divestment would
create.2" Many scholars consider joint ventures to be the "formula which
adequately conflates [sic] the interests of national and foreign investors,
and, at the same time, allows the control of the production system to be en-
tirely in the hands of host countries." 2 Inter-governmental organizations
have also espoused for a number of years the idea that "joint ventures are
the ideal formula to achieve agreement between foreign private capital, the
host government, and the local entrepreneurs." 2
Joint ventures are intended to provide foreign investors with a number
of advantages in order to encourage adequate inflow and maintenance of
foreign resources in the host countries. The local partner would provide
general knowledge of the local economy, politics, customs, bureaucratic
connections, general managerial skills, market access for local goods,
marketing organization, capital, and image improvement.24 Above all,
countries expect joint ventures owned in the majority by their nationals to
develop nationalistic behavior or national identity.
Those who espouse the national identity theory believe that such
national ownership of the majority of capital will insure that the corpora-
tion's behavior conforms to the political, social, and economic goals of the
country - "goals such as the growth of the economy, the avoidance of in-
flation, the redistribution of income, the increase of government revenue,
the modification of technology and products to suit local conditions, and so
on. " 25 There has been a "general agreement that joint ventures have a useful
20. Article I of the Code as amended by Decision 103. provides the following definitions
of enterprises:
National Enterprise: is an enterprise organized in the recipient country more than
80 percent of whose capital is owned by national investors and provided further that
same proportion is reflected will also be considered mixed enterprises, provided that
the state or the state-enterprises have the capacity to determine the decisions of the
enterprise.
Foreign Enterprise: is an enterprise organized in the recipient country whose
capital is less than 51 percent owned by national investors or, if higher, it is not re-
flected in the technical, administrative, or commercial management of the enterprise,
in thejudgment of the Competent National Authority.
21. See A. Hirschman, How to Divest in Latin America, and Why. in Princeton Essays in
International Finance, No. 76 (1969). See also W. Friedmann & J. Beguin, Joint In-
ternational Business Ventures in Developing Countries (1971).
22. M. Guerrero, supra note 14, at 237.
23. Conclusion reached by the Conference on Foreign Investment in Developing Coun-
tries, organized by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, id. at 238.
24. Chart appears correct in orginal. For the source of this chart, see L. Franko, Joint
Venture Survival in Multinational Corporations 33 (1971).
25. R. Vernon, Multinational Enterprises in Developing Countries at n. 2c (June 7, 1974)
(draft of paper prepared for United Nations Industrial Development Organization, un-
published copy in Harvard Center for International Affairs Library).
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role to play in economic development and that they provide a way of com-
bining developing countries' aspirations for a more self-reliant pattern of
development with their continuing need for foreign capital, technology, and
entrepreneurial and management skills."
26
1I. ANALYSIS
This highly praised approach to foreign investment does not fulfill the
expectations of host countries. Most arguments in favor of divestment are
premised on two assumptions: (a) That majority equity ownership conveys
effective control of an enterprise, and (b) that control in national hands
assures that the behavior of an enterprise will be in accord with the interests
of the country.27
Both of these statements are invalid, and therefore the divestment
system is fallacious.
(A) Regarding the first premise - that majority equity ownership con-
veys control of an enterprise - "it is important to bear in mind that a con-
trolling shareholder may hold significantly less than fifty-one percent of the
stock; it is familiar lore that a single active, interested shareholder or a close-
knit group may dominate a corporation's affairs with forty percent, thirty
percent, or even twenty percent or less if the remainder of the stock is held
by the scattered and semi-oblivious shareholders so typical of the large cor-
poration."28
As early as 1932, a study of U.S. corporations concluded that "the
position of ownership has changed from that of an active to that of a passive
agent.... In the corporate system the 'owner' of industrial wealth is left
with a mere symbol of ownership, while the power, the responsibility, and
the substance which have been an integral part of ownership in the past are
being transferred to a separate group in whose hands lies control." 2 9 Other
studies have arrived at what in developing countries may be deemed even
more unconventional conclusions: "A priori, there is no reason for them
(shareholders) to have any voice, direct or representational, in the catalogue
of corporate decisions ... decisions on prices, wages, and investments....
In fine, they deserve the voiceless position in which the modern development
left them." 30
Thus, the forty-nine percent share which is usually left in the hands of
foreign investors, and even much smaller percentages, is often more than
enough to control a corporation. Furthermore, in developing countries this
is aggravated by the fact that it is usually the foreign partner in the joint ven-
ture who controls the technology, know-how, and the access to a number of
26. The Colombo Plan, Special Topic Papers: Joint Ventures, Sri Lanka (1973) at 2.
27. The following analysis refers to forced joint ventures between a foreign MNE and a
local investor. If the foreign investor is not an MNE, the situation may be somewhat different.
28. D. Vagts, Basic Corporation Law 352, 438 (1973).
29. Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 52 (1932).
30. Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in the Corporation in
Modern Society 33 (E. Mason ed. 1966).
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other foreign resources and markets. In these countries, the divorce of own-
ership from control arises not only from the size of the corporation and wide
distribution of its stock, but also from the ownership of resources other than
capital which are vital to the activities of the corporation, and usually in the
hands of the foreign partner.3 The foreign partner is therefore frequently in
a position to control the enterprise effectively with only a nominal share of
its capital.
A number of studies and surveys have shown the divorce of ownership
from control in developing countries. For instance, a report on joint ven-
tures in Malaysia states that foreigners are still in control of the enterprises'
operations and that usually only a few Malaysians benefit from them.
32
Another study of foreign investments in Zambia establishes that even when
the partner is the local government, ownership does not necessarily grant
control. 3
The prevalent belief in developing countries that capital ownership
grants control of an enterprise is traceable to the fact that traditionally
capital has been the foundation of economic activity. That role is now at
least shared by technology and market access. It is therefore logical that the
power acquired through capital ownership may now also be acquired
through the ownership of technology. Patent licensing, contracts for the
transfer of technology or know-how, for management, distribution, ex-
clusive manufacture, and even for the selling of spare parts and semi-
manufactured products, usually contain clauses whereby the "effective con-
trol" of the enterprise may be removed, in a more subtle and thus more ef-
ficient way, from local shareholders.3 4
The MNE seeks to achieve least-cost production over its world-
wide operations and can best do this by pulling the affiliates
together. The desire is so strong that the parent companies will at-
tempt to gain control through non-ownership techniques even if they
cannot own sufficient equity shares. Management contracts, agree-
ments providing for the naming of tie-breaking directors or of 'key
managers', stipulations in the by-laws, or license agreements
providing control over production, quality control, and marketing
- all are means of increasing influence even when the local interests
hold a majority of the share,3"
in addition to the use of straw-men.
31. This is confirmed by C. Vaitsos who found that 92 percent of the nationally owned
firms surveyed had contracts prohibiting export of goods produced with foreign technology,
among other forms of restriction. Vaitsos, La Comercializaci6n de Tecnologia en el Pacto An-
dino (IEP, Lima 1973).
32. See Colombo Plan, supra note 26, at 91.
33. D. Smith & L. Wells, Negotiating Third World Mining Agreement, ch.2 (1976). Cf
Article 36 of the Andean Code.
34. For an analysis of each of these forms, see E. White, Empresas Multinacionales
Latinoamericanas 59 (Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, Mexico 1973).
35. J. Behrman. supra note 17, at 77.
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The acknowledgement that capital ownership no longer guarantees
control of the enterprise is probably one of the finest achievements of the
Andean divestment system. Indeed, the Code requires that the percentage of
national ownership be reflected in the "technical, administrative, financial,
and commercial management of the enterprise."36 However, it has said
nothing as to how this provision can be implemented, as to how the
"nationality" of said control is to be determined.
It may be impossible to characterize a management decision as national
or foreign: the nationality of the persons who make the decision could serve
as a guide. But shareholders do not decide at what price to sell products, or
where to sell them, or from whom or at what price to buy a technology, and
so on. Some would allege that these decisions are controlled by the direc-
tors, and that if a majority of the directors are nationals of the host country,
then the enterprise should be considered as being controlled by nationals.
This too, however, is a misleading guide. Several empirical studies conclude
that the "effective power of decision is lodged deeply in the technical, plan-
ning and other specialized staffs."" In the case of smaller enterprises in
developing countries, such control is also removed from not only the
shareholders and the boards of directors, but also from the top national
management since the ownership of technology and access to other markets
give the foreign partner a very high degree of control over the local enter-
prise.3" Also, the complexities and sophistication of many modern
technologies often make their evaluation by the local partners almost im-
possible.
Given the difficulty of the definitional problem, the Code has failed to
provide guidelines for determining the "nationality" of such control. The
Competent National Authorities have also failed to devise standards for do-
ing so. For instance, Peru, which is the Andean member carrying on divest-
ment most strictly, has been "temporarily", (although for several years),
classifying enterprises based on the nationality of the stockholders and,
sometimes, directors and managers.3 9 Thus, in practice, the novel provision
of the Code - that national ownership be reflected in the technical, ad-
ministrative, financial, and commercial management of the enterprise - is
really inapplicable."
(B) Even if majority ownership conveyed control of an enterprise, or
governments succeeded in devising ways to assure control, we should still
question whether the second premise of divestment is valid. That is, whether
control in national hands assures that the behavior of an enterprise will be in
36. For definitions see generally note 2, supra.
37. J. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, at 82 (1971).
38. See note 31 supra.
39. Interview with officers of the Comit6 de Inversiones y Tecnologias Extranjera, MEF,
Lima (May 1976).
40. The relevant provision (clause four) of the form contract prepared by the Peruvian
Ministry of Industries simply states that the foreign investor assures that any transfer of stock
ownership will also convey the corresponding percentage of control of the technical, ad-
ministrative, financial, and commercial management. No specific guidelines for the enforce-
ment of this clause are provided.
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accord with the development priorities of the country, whether control by
national investors assures "national identity" (as defined earlier).
According to the "Dependencia"' theory, within which the Andean
process has been conceived, nationality per se does not assure "national
identity." Indeed, since a common phenomenon for developing countries is
asserted to be the existence of a minority ruling class which concentrates
power and wealth, then this class is the only one with sufficient economic
means to acquire the divested foreign capital. Accordingly, at least one high
national priority, redistribution of wealth, will be frustrated. Moreover,
divestment may well intensify this problem by increasing the wealth and the
power of those minorities who would be the principal purchasers of the
shares sold by foreign investors."
As a former sponsor of joint ventures now puts it: A common
hope... is that the local businessmen will be more concerned than
their foreign partners with conforming to important national goals
.... Yet, regrettably, there is no empirical basis for those assump-
tions. To be sure, local joint ventures will prefer high profits to
low, and this preference may lead them to press for the fastest
possible growth. But the evidence that exists on the motivations of
local partners, though generally unsystematic and anecdotal in
character, nevertheless suggests that the local partner sometimes
presses for higher prices to increase the operation's profits and
payouts to increase his yield. When foreign partners have a trade
name at stake or have a different time preference function, they
have an incentive to resist such pressures, thus reversing the
assumed interests of the two partners. 3
Another study on the subject states that "a change of ownership does
not necessarily alter the behavior even if it shifts control. The managerial
objectives of the international parent may be mirrored in the behavior of the
national managers. At times, the national managers have been less oriented
toward host country interests than foreigners have been."4 At any rate,
another scholar concludes, "if [local] shareholders bear any resemblance to
their counterparts around the world, they will be only too anxious to explain
why profit maximization is the public interest.""5
41. See F. Cardoso & F. Faletto, Dependencia y Desarollo en America Latina (1971); T.
dos Santos, La Dependencia Economica en America Latina (1969); and C. Furtado, Desarollo
y Sub-Desarrollo (1970). C. Vernon, Multinational Enterprises in Developing Countries:
Issues in Dependency and Interdependency (June I, 1974) (mimeograph in Yale University
Library).
42. Even in Peru where great pressure existed to give priority to the Industrial Com-
munity, enterprises managed to sell their stocks to local businessmen instead. See Comment,
The Peruvian Social Property Law, 16 Harv. Int'l L. J. 134 (1975).
43. R. Vernon, supra note 25, at 25.
44. J. Behrman, supra note 17, at 51.
45. T. Horst, On the Benefits of Domestic Minority Ownership of Foreign-Controlled
Firms 2 (Feb. 1971) (discussion paper no. 176 in Harvard Institute of Economic Research
Library).
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A United Nations report has similarly stated: "in some developing
countries, at least, joint ventures may confer benefits on a small elite group
of nationals, but may make no material difference to the issue of control
unless the national investors themselves are active and responsive to
national priorities.""6
As the foregoing indicates, the two essential premises of divestment are
not necessarily valid, even under the Andean version of divestment.
Therefore, the "national identity" goal pursued by divestment is unlikely to
be achieved.
(C) Some scholars assert that divestment may still render substantial
economic benefits which have been widely publicized. There are, however,
some potential drawbacks commonly ignored.
The main economic benefit attributed to divestment is the reduction of
the amount of profits remitted abroad since, eventually, national instead of
foreign investors will be entitled to at least fifty-one percent of the profits.
However, it is necessary to weigh the benefits inherent in this alleged re-
duction of profit remittances abroad against some economic costs of
divestment.
The first cost of divestment is often thought to be a substantial reduc-
tion in the inflow of foreign capital and technology. The initial outcry of
foreign investors would seem to support such a possibility: "We ... do not
invest to divest [or] . .. go into business to go out of business ... [and]...
do not believe that [divestment] is likely to encourage many companies to
invest in that market."47
However, a number of studies indicate that most U.S. firms are now
willing to accept majority ownership of their subsidiaries by nationals of the
host country. One of these studies indicates that 71.8 percent of the surveyed
firms were willing to accept a majority participation of national investors in
their Latin American subsidiaries. 8 However, more sophisticated analyses
have concluded that an MNE's tolerance of joint ventures depends on its
particular type or form of business:
The American firm's critical strategy choice, on which its future
tolerance for joint ventures appears to hang, is the choice between
foreign-product diversification and foreign-product concentration.
... Firms that base their competitive strengths on the development
of new products for many overseas end-use markets appear to
have a high degree of tolerance for joint ventures .... Yet firms
that constrain their foreign activities to a particular product or,
more accurately, choose to constrain themselves to serving a par-
ticular customer-group, tend to purge themselves of joint venture
partners .... 11
46. Eminents' Report, supra note 3, at 61.
47. See A. Lopez-Valdez, supra note 15, at 10-11.
48. Meeker, Fade-Out Joint Venture: Can it Work For Latin America, in Inversion y Tec-
nologia Extranjera en America Latina 42 (1971).
49. L. Franko, Joint Venture Survival in Multinational Corporations, at n.8 1(1971).
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According to the conclusions of another study, it appears that the more a
country has industrialized, the more it needs the local presence of the sort of
firms that resist joint ventures.50 Thus joint ventures per se neither dis-
courage, nor encourage, the inflow of foreign investment; the outcome in
each case depends upon the structure of each M N E. Moreover, the potential
for an expanded market is a sufficiently attractive incentive for all firms to
require that they at least give extensive consideration to participating: "The
Andean nations have created one of the world's largest potential markets, a
market embracing millions of customers, one that a growing global com-
pany cannot afford to ignore. . especially when the Japanese and German
competition is sure to be there."'" Thus, the often asserted effect of divest-
ment - that it discourages foreign investment - is not necessarily true.
However, turning to the case of enterprises which have adopted the
joint venture form of investment, we must still consider whether the positive
effect of a reduction in profit remittances abroad compensates for certain
other negative economic trends. Several studies have noted that tensions
between partners sometimes decrease the productivity of the enterprise.
There are a number of factors that may be responsible for this trend. One
may be a relatively low rate of return to the national investor on his invest-
ment in the subsidiary, 2 because profit maximization within an MNE is not
necessarily fostered in every subsidiary, but only from the MNE as a
whole.53 Another factor might be the inability of local partners to provide
their share of additional capital needed for expansion. 4 Also, there may be
"significant differences of managerial style and personality conflicts,
between Americans and others, entrepreneurs and corporate
bureaucrats.""
It has been noted that there is no difference between a joint venture and
a wholly-owned subsidiary in orienting capital formation in ways most con-
ducive to economic growth, and also that there is no difference in their ways
of training or absorbing local entrepreneurial talent.5" However, the utiliza-
tion of local credit is more commonly a characteristic of partially-owned
subsidiaries than of wholly-owned ones which show a higher resort to
foreign capital sources.57
As for dividend policies, it has been noted that partially-owned sub-
sidiaries tend to remit dividends at a higher rate than wholly-owned com-
50. J. Stopford & L. Wells, supra note 6, at n.152.
51. R. Barnet & R. Muller, Global Reach 208 (1974).
52. M. Brooke & L. Remmers, supra note 6, at 263.
53. The simplistic assumption that MNEs are profit-maximizing entities is open to
criticism both on the basis of theory and practice ... the MNE characteristically computes its
expected payoff from a given investment, not by the isolated return from that investment . ..
but rather by the contribution it is expected to make to overall operations. D. Vagts, supra note
10, at 755-59.
54. Colombo Plan, supra note 26, at 120.
55. D. Vagts, supra note 10, at 784.
56. Colombo Plan, supra note 26, at 121.
57. See J. Stopford & L. Wells, supra note 6, at 159.
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panies which tend to reinvest profits locally. 8 Another trend is to reduce the
profits of the joint ventures as much as possible but retain the income by
charging higher prices and fees for services and goods supplied from abroad,
especially for technology. 9 Also, if an MNE has a wholly-owned and a
partially-owned subsidiary which can supply the needs of the same market,
it will normally prefer to export through the wholly-owned subsidiary. In
such a case, access to foreign markets may be restricted by the partially-
owned subsidiary. This effect is also achieved through a series of restrictive
clauses in agreements licensing the transfer of technology, with the conse-
quent negative effects in the balance of payments of the host country . 60 Ad-
ditionally, "it should be recognized that a requirement ab initio for phased
divestment can work to ... encourage multinational corporations to amor-
tize all their investment during the early years of the investment."6,
Another study states that "joint ventures have tended to change the
style of the parent by creating more formal relationships with the sub-
sidiaries. This produces a lesser flow of resources from abroad, a more
meticulous insistence by the parent on the payment of royalty fees and divi-
dends, a tighter control over exports, etc., besides the creation of a favored
class in the host country, specializing as partners of the foreigners." 62 The
above mentioned report on the Malaysian experience with joint ventures
also suggests a trend toward greater remissions of profits abroad and
reduced reinvestment locally. 3 The Government of Australia, referring to
its experience with joint ventures, has also stated that "the type and cost of
technology has not been reasonable, nor have the amounts of profits and
dividends."6 In general, the study of fourteen developing countries in-
dicates the tendency of joint ventures to emphasize dividend remittance in
preference to reinvestment, as well as the tendency to provide less
technological and scientific knowledge than do wholly-owned subsidiaries.
It further indicates that wholly-owned subsidiaries are more easily able to
obtain foreign financing, and on more favorable terms. It also shows that
joint ventures are less likely to have special rights for exporting to specific
markets. 6
5
In sum, the economic costs of joint ventures for the host country can
often be greater than the economic benefits. Considering that divestment re-
quires using the scarce local capital to buy the ongoing enterprises, instead
of using it to create new enterprises, the opportunity cost appears to be even
higher. As stated by a U. N. report:
The search for ownership requires capital. This is not always
readily available to developing countries and thus they need to
decide where their resources can be used more profitably. If con-
58. Id. at 160.
59. id. at 162. See also T. Horst, supra note 45, at n.9.
60. See note 31 supra.
61. Eminents' Report at 108.
62, Vernon, supra note 7, at 265.
63. Colonbo Plan, supra note 26, at n.91.
64. Id at 7.
65. Id. at n.121.
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trol is obtained through other means, ownership merely influences
the way in which the profits earned by an affiliate of a mul-
tinational corporation are divided between its parent company and
domestic investors.
6 6
While divestment presents no assurance of rendering any major
economic benefit to the host country, there is one certain effect of divest-
ment: political benefit.
(D) Even if the assessment of the contributions and disturbances
showed a net gain from foreign investment, governments would
still be concerned over the potential challenge to their control over
the economic, social, and political life of the nation .... The desire
for national control is at the base of almost all concern over
foreign investment. Most other fears are symptomatic of this fun-
damental fear of a loss of sovereignty.
67
Despite all its potential economic and social drawbacks, the joint venture
approach still provides the host country with a sense of increased control
over foreign investment."
This sense must not be overlooked. "Characteristically, the more
,scientific' the appraisal of foreign investment problems in Latin America,
the less the sensitivity, on the whole, to the irrational factors that often tend
to condition reality far more than most contemporary 'social science', es-
pecially economics, will take into account. ' 69 Divestment seems to be the
case in point. Even if governments become convinced that divestment
results in no economic benefit to the country, it does not seem likely that
they would renounce it. "Even if the international companies made all the
'right' decisions it would still be wrong for them to have the power and con-
trol.7 °5 As other observers put it: "Increased control over the operations
and activities of the foreign firm, either real or imaginary, promises psy-
chological or political benefits in addition to the possible financial ones."'"
It thus seems likely that MNEs will have to learn to live with participa-
tion of local partners." However, host countries must become aware of the
fact that they cannot rely on the divestment approach to effectively control
foreign investment.
66. Eminents' Report supra note 3, at 61.
67. J. Behrman, supra note 17, at 26.
68 J. Stopford & L. Wells, supra note 6, at 178.
69. Oliver, supra note 15, at 767.
70. J. Behrman, supra note 17, at 39.
71. D. Smith & L. Wells, supra note 33, at 42.
72. As the study of R. Barnet & R. Muller, supra note 51, at 63 indicates, even General
Motors, formerly a strong opponent of the joint venture approach, now accepts such modality.
Others, such as Pepsico, are devising alternatives such as the participation of nationals from the
host countries in the stock of the parent company. On this alternative, see Robinson. The
Developing Countries, Development, and the Multinational Corporation. 403 Annals 76 (1972).
However, to have the stockholders internationally scattered would probably enhance, and not
reduce, the degree of control by the top managers of the parent.
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111. CONCLUSION
One of the most serious risks entailed by the forced divestment ap-
proach is that host governments tend to think that the joint ventures thus
created relieve them from further regulating foreign investment. Such joint
ventures, however, are no panacea. Host governments cannot avoid defin-
ing, in concrete and specific terms, their main concerns about foreign invest-
ment. They have to define clearly the areas and conditions in which they
want to admit foreign investment in their territories. They must establish the
precise rules for matters such as the remittance of profits, dividends,
royalties, fees and other payments abroad by the foreign investor, and their
optimal taxation. Technology transfers, use of local credit, as well as pricing
practices of imported goods must also be comprehensively regulated. These
are only a few of the areas in which host governments must take positive ac-
tion. 3 To do so, serious and conscientious study has to be undertaken and
many legal premises have to be updated.
As the analysis of divestment suggests, legal theory has failed to keep
pace with the evolution of economic theory, especially with respect to the
modus operandi of MNEs. The law has not developed a concept broad
enough to encompass the MNE as a whole. The legal system still treats its
individual components as if they were independent entities.7 4 Further, the
law still considers capital ownership as the basic method of controlling the
enterprise, when technology and other valuable elements provided by
MNEs are more efficient means to ensure such control.75 Nor has the law
developed truly specific concepts which can allow the overall regulation of
that technology.
A primary requirement for overcoming these difficulties is the
availability of specific, reliable and current data about MNEs' modus
operandi, translated into uniform and comprehensible formats.76 Accom-
plishing this first step seems quite feasible on a multilateral basis and these
are several examples of international data gathering efforts currently under
way. 77 By utilizing this information, both home and host governments can
establish the legal rules for regulating MNEs. The different approaches may
73. The Andean Code encompasses a system of controls which constitutes a valuable at-
tempt at defining and dealing with the points of utmost concern regarding foreign investment.
This system of controls governs the entry of foreign investment, the approval of reinvestments,
profit and capital remittances abroad, use of local and foreign credit, technology transfers, and
jurisdictional matters. However, many problems have arisen with regard to the enforcement of
these rules, perhaps because member countries are too confident in the effects of divestment by
itself. For a review of the actual implementation of these controls, see Dafiino, The Andean
Code After Five Years, 8 Law. Am. 638 (1976); Rose, The Andean Pact and its Foreign Invest-
ment Code, I Tax Management Intl J. (1975).
74. See Vagts, supra note 10; Orrego, supra note 10.
75. Vagts, supra note 10, at 742.
76. D. Vagts in Eminents' Report at 389.
77. Aside from the Andean efforts to this end, both Canada and the European Economic
Community have achieved important experiences in this regard. See Orrego, supra note 10, at
110.
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be classified as: (1) Unilateral actions undertaken by the host or by the home
government; and, (2) multilateral actions partial or total."
For developing countries, the unilateral approach seems condemned to
failure due to the weak bargaining power of a single developing country vis-
a-vis an MNE. Such weakness arises from three factors: (a) The urgent need
to obtain capital as well as foreign technology, (b) the generally limited
technical skill and business sophistication necessary for negotiations and
subsequent implementation, and (c) the great power and experience concen-
trated by MNEs."1
Considering that even by 1972 ten MNEs had a GP larger than the
combined GNP of eighty countries,80 very little hope can be held out for a
single country to regulate MNEs. It is thus evident that the multinational
enterprise requires a multinational response! Multilateral responses may be
divided into regional or truly international actions.
Presently, the international approach is quite unfeasible except for the
data gathering and reciprocal information exchanges already mentioned,
because there are too many substantial differences between host govern-
ments, and the developing countries themselves, which prevent them from
reaching common agreement on a uniform set of rules for regulating the ac-
tivities of MNEs.8' Thus, regional or subregional actions by countries facing
substantially equal problems and sharing similar goals seem to be the most
feasible and effective means by which, at present, a multinational response
to multinational enterprises may be implemented.
78. Fatouros, supra note 4; Orrego, supra note 10.
79. M. Wionczek, Inversion y Tecnologia Extranjera en America Latina (1971).
80. See Rosenhouse, Empresas Multinacionales, 3 Vision 102 (1974). See also Brown, The
Multinationals and the Nation-State (1972).
8 1. On the international approaches to regulate MNEs see Kindleberger, Toward a GA TT
for Investment: A Proposal for Supervision of the International Corporation. 2 Law Pol'y Int'l
Bus. 2 (1970); see also Hymer, The Efficiency ( Contradictions) of Multinational Corporations, 60
Am. Econ. Rev. 2 (1970); Krause, The International Economic System and the Multinational
Corporation, 403 Annals 93 (1972); Matthews, The International Economy and the Nation-State,
6 Colum. .. World Bus. 51 (1971); Vagts, supra note 10, at 789.
